The Wooden Nutmeg

Going far outside of New England, I stumbled on this interesting article:

At old ranches and on some remaining farms near the foothills, one can see old barbed-wire-fence “pitch posts.” These relics of a bygone era artistically reveal some Colorado history and provide an interesting forestry lesson.

Pitch posts were cut and split from the dense and heavy wood of live pitchy trees. Pitch is a resin found in evergreen trees and it forms when trees are injured. When the injury is caused by heat from ground-surface, low-intensity forest fires, and the fire has not killed the tree, more sap is made. This resin then concentrates in outer layers of sap-wood.

Long ago, forest fires were started from lightning and often times by indigenous people. Native Americans knew that a flush of new and tender vegetation that sprouts after fire meant well-nourished game and thus better hunting. With no human effort to suppress forest fires, they were frequent, and trees were often injured by fire.

In those conditions, a “relatively young,” 150-year-old tree may have received fire damage three, four, five or more times in its lifetime. A living tree exposed to that many fires accumulates high concentrations of pitch all the way from its heartwood center out to the bark.

…

Back then, many forest fires persisted for months. These long-lasting fires took on a variety of day-to-day behavior, depending upon weather, terrain and fuel conditions in their path. Some fires smoldered underground for a long time as root fires, only to be rekindled with a strong, dry wind. Over centuries of time, subsequent fires affected miles and miles of forest, covering a wide range of aspects and elevations.

Archived here.

I found some interesting statements, below, in the 2005, “Rhode Island Forest Resources Management Plan,” archived here.

On changes to the forest:

As previously stated, forest cover in Rhode Island increased starting in the early 1800’s as abandoned farms reverted to forest. Continued farm abandonment, repeated clearing of forests for fuel, as well as forest fires kept a variety of age classes dispersed through Rhode Island’s landscape through the 1950’s. Since then, Rhode Island’s forest has matured, with 51 percent now in saw timber size class according to the most recent forest survey. The lack of young forest impacts species that need the unique nesting and feeding habitat that these early successional areas provide

And on preparedness:

13. Does RI have sufficient manpower, money, and resources to prevent or cope with a major forest fire?

The general consensus is that RI does not have the manpower, money, or resources to prevent or cope with a major forest fire.

Some observed problems are:

A. There is not enough manpower and it is perhaps not young enough for forest fire fighting within the rural volunteer fire companies.
B. There is insufficient training.
C. There are not enough vehicles and equipment.
D. Access roads into forests have been gated and allowed to become overgrown and inaccessible.
E. Due to insufficient manpower and funds, fire towers are no longer maintained and manned, except the very few remaining, during the most extreme fire danger periods.
F. There are more homes in or near forestlands and that increases the danger of fire and presents a higher risk of residential property damage, human injury, and loss of life.
G. There is a buildup of fuels on the ground and not all deep woods areas have water holes to supplement tanker trucks.

Some recommended solutions are:

A. More financial, technical, and material support, recruiting, training and equipping of rural
volunteer fire companies from town, State, and federal governments.
B. Development and distribution of a Comprehensive Mutual Aid Plan between volunteer and full-time fire departments, between towns, the State, including the RI National Guard, other states, and federal agencies. Chief David Shaw, of the Pascoag Fire Department, believes that the State Fire Chiefs Association is developing such a statewide plan that, in addition to fire, covers Emergency Medical Services and Hazardous Materials Response.
C. Providing manpower and resources for adequate resource management of private and State forestlands, and perhaps supervised, selective, timbering that could provide funds for forest management, clear fuel buildups, maintain water holes, and clear fire access roads into forests.
D. Creative ideas to keep fire towers open are to lease space on them to cell phone companies to hang their antennas and maintain them, or to rent the towers as overnight camp sights to hikers/campers.
E. Promote the passage of strict forest fire prevention laws, post them throughout forests, and enforce them.
F. Provide major forest fire prevention education, as in the “Smokey Bear” program in schools, through literature distribution, as part of general forestry education seminars, and through the media.
G. Encourage all persons, when traveling near or through forestlands, to carry cell phones and
report any evidence of forest fires immediately.

1 May 2006 was a day with Very High fire danger and Red Flag warnings across southern New England. Auburn, MA received a call at 10:42 for a brush fire. By the end of the afternoon 125 acres had burned, an abandoned mansion was lost, and aid from 38 towns and cities and 4 forest fire districts was required.

Approximately 80 acres of this area burned with enough intensity to kill / severely injure the canopy trees — this is highly unusual in southern New England in modern times.

Relative Humidity was low — 15-30% with northeast winds at 15mph gusting to 25mph. Showing how fast fire conditions can change in New England, only a week earlier heavy rains had crossed over southern New England, dumping between 1-1/2″ and 6″ of rain. The northeast winds portended the heavy rain that would move in on the morning of May second.

Since the fire this area was also on the edge of the December, 2008 ice storm. The impact was noticeable and would impact future operations but is not severe.

This is a map of the area from July, 2007 that shows the extensive severely burned area (the brown discolored areas). I’m eyeballing it to be about 80 acres, and the overall fire was put at 125 acres which I believe is reasonable — not all areas hit that stand killing intensity.

The fire appears to have originated south of this lane. The tree appears to have been snapped by the ice storm. A hang up like this one is a challenging one to cut safely, yet it also isn’t safe to allow forestry trucks to pass underneath — a situation that would delay access to fires along the lane in the future.

(There are smudges on the photos taken April 26, 2009 — I had water spots on my camera lens.)

Near the tail of the fire area was this tree, it’s main trunk killed by the extensive burning of it’s bark, which was “stump sprouting” new growth. Hundreds, probably thousands, of these small snags will stand for years to come, surrounded by the fine brush of regrowth.

This mountain laurel, judging from the standing dead trunk, was about 4′ tall when the fire burned. In areas the mountain laurel easily topped 6′. Like the snag in the previous picture, the dead trunk provides additional dry fuel that would intensify a future fire. Mountain laurel provided the fuel load that allowed the fire to be intense enough to kill the hardwood trees. You can read more about the fire ecology of mountain laurel here.

This is a mix of regrowing brush and some living and some fire killed overstory trees. When looking at these photos (click on them for the full size version) the tell tale sign of killed trees is the lack of the smallest branches — only the trunks and main branches remain.

A mix of living and dead trees. Approximately point “A” on the map. Fire potential here is elevated further by the lack of shade; while it may not be a critical difference in spring time this could contribute in summer and fall to the area being prone to larger, hotter fires then otherwise would occur. One of the big reasons for the decline in size and intensity of forest fires in southern New England is the success of previous generations in suppressing fires and allowing the forests to mature. While there are exceptions, in general the larger trees were more likely to survive while smaller trees were fatally injured by the flames.

More dead trees. Approximately point “B.” In the middle of the picture is the top of a white pine that broke off in the ice storm.

Many hardwood saplings coming up, I’m not sure what species these are — I should revisit later in the year when I can identify the leaves.

This is the first steep hillside — about a 30% grade. It’s also strewn with rocks, and soft soil — absolutely treacherous to walk over. The fire killed few if any trees on these steep slopes. My observation is there wasn’t much mountain laurel to provide dense amounts of fuel. From a tactical perspective, it would be near impossible to build a fire line through this mess and clambering over the terrain with an Indian Tank would be inviting a sprained ankle. Hose lines would work best, albeit slow to progress.

Looking towards the top of the hill you can see a mixture of killed trees and ice storm damage.

After a climb of 100′, we come to these flats (point “C” on the map), showing a mixture of fire and ice storm damage. The mountain laurel thickets started up again on the flats, providing the fuel for the stand killing intensity.

This picture is chilling to think of how quickly our forests could revert to this state by a combination of disturbances in quick succession — say a major hurricane followed by a few dry years and killing intensity fires burning through the slash. Like this patch, they would then be at increased risk for decades of additional fire disturbances until a mature forest can regrow.

At this point I intersected the woods road along which I took the photos in 2006. This is further west along that road, at point “D” on the map.

Looking through the woods you can see a steep rise — pushing 60% slope at parts — and then a flat area on top looking awful sparse. If you look at the map, that is the area of the most intense damage. My guess is the fire intensified from a combination of later in the day (more pre-heating), elevation (windier), and having a wider fire front. The destroyed mansion was located at the blue dot.

The woods road at this point passed through very tall, very dense mountain laurel — 6′ high or better judging from the dead trunks. Some trees had scorch marks and mushrooms growing in fire-killed bark 15′ above the ground.

The acronym LCES stands for Lookouts, Communication, Escape Routes, and Safety Zones. In this case a safety zone — ordinary hardwood duff, with it’s low, slow burning characteristics was only a hundred feet or so away in the hollow between this point at the steep hillside. However the mountain laurel looks like it would’ve been impenetrable to get there. It’s a place like this I fear seeing guys in structural bunker pants and ill fitting boots getting caught in southern New England, unable to move quickly enough down the trail to escape an oncoming fire.

Let’s review a few key pictures from the fire day itself. These were taken along the woods road at approximately point “E.” You can find more at my original write up here.

Yes, it burns! There was a small draw to the east of the road, so the fire had a uphill run to my location. I had gotten in here before I saw any firefighters or officers, so I’m not sure if they planned to make a stand here earlier or I just had good dumb luck in finding the spot.

Sturbridge working their forestry into location. This was a good location to make a stand — while you can see the higher mountain laurel in the background, between it and the fire picture above was much lower laurel — may 2′ high, probably a patch that burned years ago. They are cutting a hole in the brush to allow the unit to turn around so it can be headed out in case a quick retreat is needed. Additionally, a good safety zone is only a few dozen feet west of this location where the laurel suddenly ends and it is not so thick as to be able to be hard to move through.

Even if the picture is deceptive. We’re only on the edge of the thicket here.

Wildland gear is not standard issue in New England at this time. I honestly prefer the guy in a T-shirt, jeans, and workboots over having someone in completely inappropriate structural PPE on a woods fire — they are far more likely to seriously injure themselves from exhaustion or a fall due to wearing that gear then the guy in jeans, tee, and good boots is to burn himself. The guy wearing the good wildland guy isn’t a state guy either — it’s very unusual to see that level of complete wildland PPE on a municipal firefighter here, at best you usually see just a wildland shirt with jeans.

There is another crew working in from the railroad tracks who directly attacked the flank with a hoseline working up from the railroad tracks to the woods road (one the right or east side). One of these lines would be used to protect the Sturbridge’s position in case the fire got over the lines being made, and the other hose would be used to work a line to the left (west) of the road.

A well dressed firefighter making short work of the burning laurel. That’s an 1-1/8″ Massachusetts forestry hose line. From this point they started working the fire to the left, burning mostly in duff from here up the steep hill.

Later on, Sturbridge’s location quite safe, the crew moved from protecting it to stretching another line through the hollow to hellp with mop-up on top of the hill.

This picture shows the rather sparse laurel at this point and how easy it would be to get from the road to a safe area. This, I don’t believe, was true at point “D” as I mentioned above, where there was still a lot of thick laurel between the road and a safe zone.

I like the easy to carry bundles if you carry your hose that way. Give me a backpack though and I’d be happier.

Water supply for this area was established by Oxford laying in a 4000′ 5″ line with their reel truck. I don’t know if it was a consideration in the decision to lay a line, but by this point tankers were being used to support operations in residential areas threatened by the head of the fire.